Interview with Nicolas Meilhan, Engineer and Expert in Energy, Industrial, and Mobility Policies

1. Since the US-Israeli strikes against Iran on February 28, 2026, what impact have disruptions to oil traffic in the Strait of Hormuz already had on oil prices, and how far could this rise go if the conflict drags on?

The Strait of Hormuz is one of the vital arteries of the global economy. Under normal circumstances, around 20 million barrels of oil and petroleum products transit through it every day—nearly 20% of global consumption.

Before the war began, Brent was around $72 a barrel. Today it is trading around $116—a rise of more than 60%. So we have already suffered a major oil shock.

The problem is that there is no real alternative to Hormuz. Saudi and Emirati pipelines can bypass the strait for a few million barrels per day, but certainly not for the 20 million that normally transit through it.

If the disruptions continue, $150 oil is entirely conceivable. In an extreme scenario of a total and lasting closure, $200 cannot be ruled out. But at those levels, global consumption would eventually fall sharply, which would gradually limit the increase.

And we must not forget that oil is not only used to make our cars run. It powers trucks, planes, ships, tractors, and a large part of our industry. When oil is scarce, the entire economy slows down.

2. With the Houthis present around Bab el-Mandeb and their attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure, are the alternative routes to Hormuz still safe?

That is precisely what makes the situation particularly dangerous.

Saudi Arabia has built an East-West pipeline that allows its oil to be routed to Yanbu on the Red Sea without passing through Hormuz. But attacks on Saudi infrastructure and Houthi threats in the Red Sea also weaken this solution.

Bab el-Mandeb can be bypassed by going around the Cape of Good Hope, at the cost of several thousand additional kilometers. However, Hormuz cannot really be bypassed for the volumes concerned.

And there is a second problem: the Middle East has become not only a major oil-producing region but also a global refining hub.

According to the International Energy Agency, refined product exports from the Middle East in September remained more than half below their pre-war level.

In other words, even if we manage to extract oil and transport it, we still need to be able to refine it to produce diesel, gasoline, or jet fuel.

We are facing a dual crisis: one of crude oil and one of refined products.

3. On October 1, the Trump administration asked France and Germany to release their diesel reserves, threatening to limit American exports. What is your view?

For once, Donald Trump is putting his finger on a real problem: today, the global diesel market is even tighter than the crude oil market.

In Europe, we have gradually closed part of our refining capacity while continuing to consume a great deal of diesel. Before 2022, a significant share of our imports came from Russia. We then replaced those volumes with imports from the United States, the Middle East, and India.

And today we have simultaneously the disruption of refining in the Middle East and Ukrainian strikes against Russian refineries.

According to the IEA, disruptions in the Middle East and Russia led in September to a cumulative loss of around 1.3 million barrels per day of diesel exports compared with the previous year, partially offset by other countries.

Donald Trump was even considering limiting American exports to bring down prices in the United States. But that would simply have meant exporting the shortage to Europe.

The G7 ultimately favored a coordinated release of strategic reserves, with a target of up to 100 million barrels of petroleum products and crude over four months.

France, for its part, announced the release of 10 million barrels of diesel onto the market starting November 1, with the goal of lowering pump prices by 12 to 18 cents per liter for three months.

That is a useful short-term response. But strategic stocks buy time: they do not replace the Russian diesel barrels we have deprived ourselves of.

4. Faced with rising fuel prices and energy tensions, what are the consequences for Emmanuel Macron's France? Is the government sufficiently prepared for a prolonged energy crisis?

France has a considerable advantage over many of its European neighbors: thanks to nuclear power, it produces most of its electricity domestically and with very few hydrocarbons.

However, for transport, we remain extremely dependent on oil, particularly diesel.

The government has strategic reserves and has just decided to use part of them. But this is obviously not a sustainable solution if the crisis lasts for several months, or even several years.

The 10 million barrels of diesel we are about to release onto the market represent about 19% of our consumption over three months. That is significant, but it also shows the limits of this type of measure.

And there is a fiscal issue. A significant share of pump fuel prices consists of taxes. The government could therefore also act on this lever, even though it would obviously have a cost for public finances.

But the fundamental question is that of our energy sovereignty.

Sovereignty means managing one's dependencies.

We have no oil in France, but we can refine it. In the same way, we extract virtually no uranium, but we can enrich it and produce our electricity.

Closing refineries in France to import more diesel does not eliminate our oil consumption. It simply shifts our industrial dependence abroad.

5. As the midterm elections approach, what could be the impact of rising oil and fuel prices on Donald Trump and the Republican Party?

There is a rather extraordinary paradox for Donald Trump.

With oil above $100, American producers are making a lot of money. This encourages investment and makes economically viable certain wells that were not when prices were lower.

But the American voter is paying much more for gasoline and diesel.

And diesel is particularly important because it powers the trucks that carry goods and a large share of agricultural machinery.

When diesel rises, the price of almost all products ultimately rises.

Donald Trump therefore finds himself facing a contradiction: expensive energy benefits American oil producers but penalizes consumers and fuels inflation.

This is notably why his administration is seeking to increase fuel supply and secure a release of strategic stocks.

Just days before the November 3 midterm elections, fuel prices are a major economic and political issue. They will not determine the outcome of the vote on their own, but they complicate the narrative of abundant and cheap energy.

6. Can the current energy crisis and the surge in oil prices undermine Europe's energy transition, or on the contrary accelerate it?

Just look at what happened after the oil shocks of the 1970s.

At the time, France was extremely dependent on oil, including for producing its electricity. The Messmer plan and the massive development of nuclear power allowed us to considerably reduce that dependence.

It is probably one of the most effective energy sovereignty policies we have pursued in fifty years.

The problem is that we have never truly carried out the same transformation in transport.

Today, the best protection against $150 oil is obviously to consume less oil. And for passenger cars, that means electrification in particular.

But we still need abundant and cheap electricity. If we replace our dependence on imported oil with a dependence on batteries and vehicles imported from China, we will simply have shifted part of the problem.

We must therefore simultaneously develop decarbonized electricity production and our industry.

The energy transition must be a policy of industrial and energy sovereignty, not solely a policy of reducing CO₂ emissions.

7. Donald Trump claims that Ukrainian strikes against Russian refineries now weigh more on oil prices than the war against Iran. Does this analysis seem sound to you?

For once, I recently said something good about Donald Trump because he seems to have understood that Ukrainian strikes against Russian refineries have a direct impact on the price of diesel paid by the MAGA voter. Better late than never.

But we must distinguish between crude oil and diesel.

On crude oil, the major factor clearly remains the Middle East. The disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz involve considerable volumes, beyond comparison with the Russian refining capacity affected.

On diesel, however, Ukrainian strikes play a much more important role.

Russia has around 6.5 million barrels per day of refining capacity and was historically one of the world's major diesel exporters.

According to the latest IEA report, combined disruptions in the Middle East and Russia continue to remove considerable volumes from the global diesel market.

In September, global diesel exports were 700,000 barrels per day below their level of the previous year, despite efforts by other countries to compensate for Russian and Middle Eastern losses.

And above all, the IEA now estimates that the diesel market could remain very tight until 2027.

That is what is new: we are no longer simply in a one-off oil price crisis, but in a lasting crisis of global supply of refined products.

Hormuz primarily causes a shock to crude oil. Ukrainian strikes cause a shock to Russian refining. And the two compound on the global diesel market.

This is why the price of diesel is today far more revealing of energy tensions than the Brent price alone.

Having oil is not enough. One must still be able to refine it.